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Abstract—In massive MIMO wiretap settings, the base station
can significantly suppress eavesdroppers by narrow beamforming
toward legitimate terminals. Numerical investigations show that
by this approach, secrecy is obtained at no significant cost. We
call this property of massive MIMO systems “secrecy for free”
and show that it not only holds when all the transmit antennas
at the base station are employed, but also when only a single
antenna is set active. Using linear precoding, the information
leakage to the eavesdroppers can be sufficiently diminished, when
the total number of available transmit antennas at the base
station grows large, even when only a fixed number of them are
selected. This result indicates that passive eavesdropping has no
significant impact on massive MIMO systems, regardless of the
number of active transmit antennas.
Index Terms—Massive MIMO systems, physical layer security,
antenna selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, massive Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO)
systems have emerged as a promising enabling technology
to address the explosive growth of data traffic in the next
generation of wireless networks (5G) [1]. Reliable and secure
transmission of data in 5G is of paramount importance for
system designers. In this respect, physical layer security, com-
plemented with cryptographic approaches in upper layers of
the network, provides a well-integrated secure platform by
exploiting the imperfection of the communication channels
[2]. The pioneering work on physical layer security goes back
to Wyner who studied a point to point wiretap channel in [3]
and showed that confidential message transmission is possible
as long as the eavesdropper observes a degraded version of
the signal received at the legitimate terminal. Wyner’s result
was later extended to several other settings including MIMO
wiretap channels [4], [5].
In massive MIMO systems, the large number of antennas
can provide more security by narrow beamforming toward
legitimate receivers. In this case, the signal strength at the
eavesdropper, which is located somewhere outside the main
beam, is much lower than the strength of the signal received
at the legitimate terminal. This observation was demonstrated
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in [6] via numerical investigations where the authors showed
that passive eavesdropping in not-too-dense networks has little
impacts on the secrecy performance. Similar to other perfor-
mance gains of massive MIMO, this robustness against passive
eavesdropping is obtained at the expense of high hardware
cost and complexity imposed by the large number of antennas
in these systems. The impact of passive eavesdropping on the
secrecy performance in dense networks has been further in-
vestigated in [7].
Several approaches were proposed in the literature to allevi-
ate the cost-complexity issue of massive MIMO, e.g., [8]–[10].
A promising solution is antenna selection in which the trans-
mission is carried out through a subset of antennas; see [11]
and [12], and the references therein. In addition to its main
objective, i.e., reducing the overall Radio Frequency (RF)-
cost, antenna selection has shown to enhance the performance
in some scenarios. In [12] and [13], it was demonstrated that in
several MIMO settings, energy efficiency is not an increasing
function of the number of transmit antennas, and thus, it can
be improved by switching off some of them. The authors in
[14], moreover, showed that in MIMO wiretap settings, the
secrecy performance, when no precoding is utilized at the
Base Station (BS), is optimized when only a few transmit
antennas are set active. The security benefits of optimal single
antenna selection was further discussed in [15].
Objectives and Contributions
Considering the implementational issues in massive MIMO
systems, this study aims to answer the following question: Are
massive MIMO wiretap settings robust against passive eaves-
dropping when only a subset of transmit antennas are set ac-
tive? To this end, we investigate the robustness against passive
eavesdropping by defining the concept of “secrecy for free”. It
is then shown that even when only a single transmit antenna is
set active, by simple linear precoding, the information leakage
to the eavesdropper vanishes, as the total number of available
antennas at the BS increases. This result indicates that with
a large transmit antenna array, regardless of the number of
active antennas, secrecy can be achieved at no significant cost.
Our analysis moreover provides rigorous justifications for the
earlier numerical observations on the robustness of massive
MIMO systems against passive eavesdropping, e.g., [6], con-
sidering a more generic setup.
Notations
Throughout the paper, scalars, vectors and matrices are rep-
resented by non-bold, bold lower case and bold upper case
letters, respectively. The set of real numbers is denoted by
R and the complex plane is shown by C. HH, H∗ and HT
indicate the Hermitian, complex conjugate and transpose of
H, respectively. log (·) is the binary logarithm. We denote the
statistical expectation by E , and the non-negative part of x by
[x]+ = max{0, x}. The beta distribution with the shape pa-
rameters α and β is denoted by B (α, β); moreover,N (η, σ2)
and CN (η, σ2) represent the real and complex Gaussian dis-
tribution with mean η and variance σ2, respectively.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider downlink transmission in a multiuser MIMO
wiretap setting. In this setting, a BS with M antennas in-
tends to transmit confidential messages to K legitimate users
while the channel being overheard by an eavesdropper. For
simplicity, we assume that the receiving terminals, i.e., the
legitimate users and the eavesdropper, are single-antenna. By
a same approach taken in [9], the analysis can be extended to
scenarios with multi-antenna receiving terminals. The BS is
equipped with L ≤ M RF-chains. Hence, in each coherence
time interval, only L transmit antennas are set active.
The uplink channel from user terminal k to the BS is rep-
resented by hk ∈ CM and reads
hk =
√
βk gk (1)
where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} denotes the legitimate users and k = e
indicates the eavesdropper. The entries of gk ∈ CM denote
fast fading coefficients between user k and the transmit an-
tennas, and βk models path loss and shadowing. It is assumed
that βk is constant over several coherence time intervals and
is known in priori. This is the case in most practical scenarios.
As the result, the legitimate uplink channel can be written as
H = [h1, . . . ,hK ] = GΓ
1/2 (2)
where G = [g1, . . . ,gK ] and Γ is a K ×K diagonal matrix
with [Γ]kk = βk. We further assume that the system operates
in standard Time-Division Duplexing (TDD) mode meaning
that the uplink and downlink channels are reciprocal.
At the beginning of each coherence time interval, the BS
employs a selection algorithm to select L transmit antennas.
We denote the set of the selected antennas with
L = {ℓ1, . . . , ℓL} (3)
where 1 ≤ ℓj ≤M for j = 1, . . . , L. The effective legitimate
uplink channel after antenna selection is therefore described
by H˜ ∈ CL×K which is constructed from H by collecting
the ℓj-th rows of H for j = 1, . . . , L. Similarly, the effective
uplink channel from the eavesdropper to the BS is denoted by
h˜e ∈ CL whose entries are the entries of he indexed by L.
A. Secure Transmission under Antenna Selection
For k = 1, . . . ,K , let uk represent the confidential message
aimed to be received by legitimate user k. uk is encoded into
the codeword [sk(1), . . . , sk(N)] where N is the code-length.
The encoded vector s(n) = [s1(n), . . . , sK(n)]
T is then given
to the BS for transmission in the n-th time instant over the L
selected transmit antennas. For this aim, the BS constructs the
transmit signal x(n) ∈ CL from s(n) using a linear precoder.
This means that, for n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
x(n) =
√
P Ws(n), (4)
where P constrains the transmit power and W ∈ CL×K is
the shaping matrix satisfying ETr{WWH} = 1. Assuming
that sk(n) ∼ CN (0, 1) for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the total transmit
power in (4) is constrained to P .
By transmitting x(n) over the selected antennas, the legit-
imate terminals receive
y(n) = H˜Tx(n) + nm(n), (5)
where y(n) := [y1(n), . . . , yK(n)]
T with yk(n) denoting
the signal received by the k-th legitimate user in the time
instant n, and nm(n) ∈ CK×1 is independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with
variance σ2m. The eavesdropper moreover receives
z(n) = h˜Te x(n) + ne(n) (6)
where ne(n) ∼ CN (0, σ2e ).
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate
In the absence of the eavesdropper, the maximum achiev-
able rate of user k is bounded from below by [16]
Rmk = log(1 + SINRmk ) (7)
where SINRmk is the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio
(SINR) at the legitimate terminal k and is given by
SINRmk =
ρm|h˜Tkwk|2
1 + ρm
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
|h˜Tkwj |2
. (8)
Here, ρm = P/σ
2
m, and h˜k and wk are L× 1 vectors which
denote the kth column of H˜ and W, respectively.
For user k, the maximum achievable secrecy rate is defined
as the maximum rate at which the BS can transmit information
to legitimate user k such that no information about uk is
leaked to the eavesdropper. This rate is lower-bounded by [5]
Rsk = [Rmk −Rek]+ (9)
where Rek represents the maximum achievable rate over the
eavesdropper’s channel under the worst-case assumption that
the eavesdropper is able to cancel out the interference of other
legitimate terminals1. Consequently, Rek is given by
Rek = log(1 + SNRek) (10)
1This is not necessarily the case, and therefore, (9) gives a lower bound.
where SNRek is the SINR at the eavesdropper while overhear-
ing uk and reads
SNRek = ρe|h˜Tewk|2 (11)
with ρe = P/σ
2
e . By substituting into (9), Rsk reads
Rsk = log
(
1 + SINRmk
1 + SNRek
)
. (12)
C. Relative Secrecy Cost
Secrecy at the physical layer is obtained at the expense of
reduction in the data rate. As (9) indicates, this cost depends
on the quality of the eavesdropper’s channel. We quantify this
cost by defining the measure “relative secrecy cost” as follows.
Definition 1 (Relative secrecy cost): Assume L antennas are
selected out of M available transmit antennas. Let Rsk(M,L)
and Rmk (M,L) denote the secrecy rate to user k and the
achievable rate to user k in the absence of the eavesdropper,
respectively. The relative secrecy cost for user k is defined as
Ck(M,L) := 1− R
s
k(M,L)
Rmk (M,L)
. (13)
From the definition of the relative secrecy cost, one simply
observes that 0 ≤ Ck(M,L) ≤ 1 where the lower bound
holds when Rmk (M,L) = Rsk(M,L) and the upper bound
is achieved when Rsk(M,L) = 0. Ck(M,L) determines the
fraction of available rate being used to secure the transmission.
We show that this cost converges to zero in massive MIMO
wiretap setups even under antenna selection. We refer to this
phenomenon as “secrecy for free” in massive MIMO systems
in the presence of passive eavesdroppers.
III. SECRECY FOR FREE
Secrecy for free intuitively means that the achievable rate
in the absence of the eavesdropper and the achievable secrecy
rate in the presence of the eavesdropper are nearly the
same when the number of transmit antennas grows large. To
formulate this property, we state the following definition.
Definition 2 (Asymptotic secrecy for free): Let ρm = P/σ
2
m
and ρe = P/σ
2
e be bounded from above. For a given number
of active transmit antennas L, the multiuser MIMO wiretap
setting with passive eavesdropper illustrated in Section II is
said to asymptotically achieve secrecy for free when
lim
M↑∞
Ck(M,L) = 0 (14)
for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
In a multiuser MIMO system, in which secrecy is achieved
asymptotically for free, Rsk ≈ Rmk when the number of
transmit antennas is large. This means that the BS can
confidentially transmit messages to each legitimate user with
almost no loss in terms of the achievable rate.
In what follows, we show that this property holds in general
in massive MIMO wiretap setups with passive eavesdroppers
even when only a fixed number of transmit antennas are set
active. Throughout our investigations, we consider a Rayleigh
fast fading model for the channels. This means that the
entries of gk for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K, e} are independent complex
Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. We moreover
consider Maximum Ratio Transmission (MRT) precoding at
the BS, which is typical for massive MIMO systems [17]. This
means that we set wk = h˜
∗
k/‖h˜k‖ for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The
analysis is readily extended to other linear precoders as well as
bi-unitarily invariant channel matrices2 by a similar approach.
A. Secrecy For Free under Full Transmit Complexity
We begin with the case of full transmit complexity in which
all transmit antennas are set active. In this case, h˜k = hk for
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K, e} and wk = h∗k/‖hk‖. Thus, the SINR at the
legitimate terminal k reads
1
M
SINRmk =
1
M
ρm‖hk‖2
1 + ρm
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
|hTkh∗j |2
‖hj‖2
(15a)
=
1
M
ρm
M
βk‖gk‖2
1
M
+ ρm
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
1
M2 βk|gTkg∗j |2
1
M ‖gj‖2
(15b)
†−→ ρmβk (15c)
where−→ indicates convergence in mean square, and † comes
from channel hardening [19] and the favorable propagation
property [20] of massive MIMO systems. In fact, from channel
hardening, we have ‖gk‖2/M −→ E{‖gk‖2}/M = 1 as M
grows large. Moreover, the favorable propagation property of
the channel for largeM implies that |gTkg∗j |/M −→ 0 for any
k 6= j.
Denoting the achievable rate withM transmit antennas over
the legitimate channel k by3 Rmk (M), we conclude from (15c)
that
Rmk (M)− log (1 + ρmβkM) −→ 0. (16)
Similarly, by invoking channel hardening and the favorable
propagation property, we have for SNRek
1
M
SNRek =
1
M
ρe
|hTe h∗k|2
‖hk‖2 (17a)
=
ρe
M2
βe|gTe g∗k|2
1
M
‖gk‖2
−→ 0. (17b)
From (15c) and (17b), we can write(
1 + SINRmk
1 + SNRek
)
/ (1 + ρmβkM) −→ 1. (18)
Considering (12), (18) leads us to conclude that
Rsk(M)− log (1 + ρmβkM) −→ 0. (19)
2The random matrix H ∈ CM×K is bi-unitarily invariant, if for any pair
of independent unitary matrices U ∈ CM×M and V ∈ CK×K , the entries
of H and UHVH have same distribution [18].
3We have dropped the argument L for the case of full transmit complexity
as in this case L = M .
Here, Rsk(M) is the achievable secrecy rate with full transmit
complexity. From (16) and (19), we have
lim
M↑∞
Ck(M) = 1− lim
M↑∞
log (1 + ρmβkM)
log (1 + ρmβkM)
= 0 (20)
where Ck(M) represents the relative secrecy cost under full
complexity, i.e., L = M . From (20), one observes that secrecy
in massive MIMO wiretap settings with passive eavesdroppers
is achieved for free under full complexity, and therefore, for
large M , we have Rsk ≈ Rmk . The intuition behind this result
is that in this setting, the precoder can accurately focus the
transmission beam on the legitimate terminals, due to the large
number of transmit antennas. This beam becomes significantly
narrow, as the number of transmit antennas grows large, and
therefore, the leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes.
Remark 1: Here, secrecy for free is achieved by simple MRT
precoding. This means that in a massive MIMO setting, the
BS can exclude the eavesdropper without knowing the channel
state information of the eavesdropper.
B. Secrecy For Free under Antenna Selection
With a large number of transmit antennas, two scenarios
for antenna selection can be considered:
1) The number of selected antennas L grows large with the
total number of antennasM , such that L/M is kept fixed.
2) The number of selected antennas is kept fixed, e.g. L =
1, while the total number of antennas growing large.
In the first scenario, by a similar approach as in Section III-A,
it is shown that secrecy is asymptotically achieved for free.
In fact, in this case, as the number of active antennas grows
proportional with the total number of transmit antennas, the
precoder can narrow its beam toward the legitimate users, and
thus, the leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes in the large-
system limit4. We therefore concentrate on the second scenario
in this section and show that even for a fixed number of active
antennas, secrecy is achieved asymptotically for free.
For the sake of presentation, we set K = 1. Nevertheless,
all results and findings extend to arbitrary K in a straight-
forward way. In this case, H = h1
√
β1g1 where we use the
notation
h1 = [h1, . . . , hM ]
T, (21a)
g1 = [g1, . . . , gM ]
T. (21b)
To select a subset of transmit antennas, the following algo-
rithm is employed at the beginning of each coherence time in-
terval: The BS sorts channel coefficients h1, . . . , hM such that
|hℓ1 |2 ≥ . . . ≥ |hℓM |2 (22)
and selects the L strongest antennas, i.e., L = {ℓ1, . . . , ℓL}.
4To show this argument, one can start with a random selection algorithm
which selects a fixed fraction of transmit antennas at random. Taking exactly
same steps as in Section III-A, it is shown that secrecy is also achieved for free
in this case. As the result, other algorithms achieve secrecy asymptotically for
free in the first scenario, since all algorithms are superior to random selection.
Under this antenna selection algorithm, the SINR at the
legitimate terminal reads
SINRm1 = ρm‖h˜‖2 = ρmβ1
L∑
ℓ=1
|gjℓ |2 = ρmβ1Ξ (23)
where we define
Ξ :=
L∑
ℓ=1
|gjℓ |2. (24)
In the context of order statistics [21], Ξ is known as a trimmed
sum. The large-system distribution of a trimmed sum has been
given in [22]. Note that by the large-system limit in this case,
we mean that L is kept fixed and onlyM grows large. In [22],
the asymptotic distribution of a trimmed sum is derived for a
general distribution of summands. Noting that the summands
in Ξ are exponentially distributed, one can invoke the main
theorem of [22] and write
Ξ ∼ N
(
L
(
1 + ψ log
M
L
)
, L
(
2− L
M
))
(25)
where ψ = 1/ log e ≈ 0.6931. From (25), one observes that
as M grows large, Ξ converges in distribution to a Gaussian
random variable whose mean increases with logM and whose
variance converges to a constant. Consequently, one can write
lim
M↑∞
E
{
SINRm1
logM
}
= ψρmβ1L (26a)
lim
M↑∞
E
{∣∣∣∣SINRm1logM − E
{
SINRm1
logM
}∣∣∣∣
2
}
= 0 (26b)
which implies that
SINRm1
logM
−→ ψρmβ1L (27)
or equivalently
Rm1 (M,L)− log (1 + ψρmβ1L logM) −→ 0 (28)
where Rm1 (M,L) denotes the achievable rate over the main
channel when L out of M available transmit antennas are
selected via the selection algorithm.
Considering the eavesdropper, SNRe1 is written as
SNRe1 = ρe
|h˜Te h˜∗1|2
‖h˜1‖2
(29a)
= ρeβe‖g˜e‖2 cos2 θ (29b)
where θ denotes the Hermitian angle between g˜1 and g˜e and
is defined as
θ := cos−1
( |g˜Te g˜∗1|
‖g˜e‖‖g˜1‖
)
. (30)
To determine the large-system limit of SNRe1, we consider the
following lines of justifications:
(a) As h1 and he are statistically independent, any ordered
sorting on the entries of h1 results in a random permu-
tation of he. Therefore, the entries of h˜e are statistically
similar to the entries of a random selection. In other
words, from the eavesdropper’s point of view, the antenna
selection algorithm is random selection. This fact implies
that the entries of g˜e are independent complex Gaussian
with zero mean and unit variance.
(b) Note that the illustrated selection algorithm sorts the
channel coefficients with respect to the magnitudes. This
fact, implies that the direction of g˜1 is statistically similar
to the direction of a randomly selected vector. Therefore,
the Hermitian angle between g˜1 and g˜e is distributed
similar to the hermitian angle between two independent
Gaussian random vectors5 of size L.
(c) The distribution of the squared cosine of the Hermitian
angle between two independent Gaussian vectors of
length L is B (1, L− 1); see [23, Appendix C].
(d) Since g˜e ∼ CN (0, IL), the normalization ve = g˜e/‖g˜e‖
is independent of ‖g˜e‖. Therefore, the random variable
cos θ = |vTe g˜∗1|/‖g˜1‖ is independent of ‖g˜e‖, as well.
Considering the above lines of justifications, one can conclude
that cos2 θ ∼ B (1, L− 1) and is independent of ‖g˜e‖2. ‖g˜e‖2
is moreover a chi-square random variable with 2L degrees of
freedom, mean L and variance L. Consequently, the expected
value of SNRe1 reads
E {SNRe1} = ρeβe E
{‖g˜e‖2}E {cos2 θ} (31a)
= ρeβe L
1
L
= ρeβe. (31b)
To determine the variance of SNRe, we note that
E
{|SNRe1|2} = ρ2eβ2e E {‖g˜‖2}2 E {cos2 θ}2 (32a)
= ρ2eβ
2
e L(L+ 1)
2
L(L+ 1)
= 2ρ2eβ
2
e (32b)
which results in
E
{|SNRe1|2}− E {SNRe1}2 = ρ2eβ2e . (33)
From (31b) and (33), it is concluded that SNRe1 takes random
values around ρeβe with the finite variance ρ
2
eβ
2
e . Thus,
lim
M↑∞
E
{
SNRe1
logM
}
= 0, (34a)
lim
M↑∞
E
{∣∣∣∣SNRe1logM − E
{
SNRe1
logM
}∣∣∣∣
2
}
= 0, (34b)
or equivalently, we can write
SNRe1
logM
−→ 0. (35)
Considering (27) along with (35), we have
Rs1(M,L)− log (1 + ψρmβ1L logM) −→ 0 (36)
where Rs1(M,L) denotes the achievable secrecy rate when L
transmit antennas are selected.
5In the large-system limit, this statement can be rigorously justified by con-
sidering a sequence {θM} and showing that it converges in distribution to
the Hermitian angle of two independent Gaussian vectors of the same size
as M grows large. Similar discussions can be found in [9].
Invoking the arguments in (28) and (36), the asymptotic
relative secrecy cost C1(M,L) in this case reads
lim
M↑∞
C1(M,L)=1− lim
M↑∞
log (1 + ψρmL logM)
log (1 + ψρmL logM)
= 0. (37)
From (37), it is observed that even by selecting a fixed number
of antennas, secrecy is achieved for free as the total number of
available antennas grows unboundedly large. This observation
intuitively comes from this fact that the growth in the total
number of transmit antennas improves the channel quality
of the selected antennas while the eavesdropper’s channel
remaining unchanged. Hence, as M grows large, the leakage
to the eavesdropper becomes negligible compared to the
achievable rate over the main channel, and we haveRs ≈ Rm.
Remark 2: The large-system analysis considers a fixed num-
ber of active antennas. This means that the result is valid even
when a single antenna is selected. The characterization for
single transmit antenna selection can be more precisely ad-
dressed using the extreme value distribution given by Fisher-
Tippet law [21]; see the studies in [24], [25] for some partic-
ular examples. Nevertheless, both the approaches lead to this
conclusion that the secrecy cost vanishes as M grows large.
Remark 3: Considering the cases of full transmit complexity
and antenna selection with fixed L, one observes that in either
cases Rek does not grow large with M while the achievable
rate over the main channel scales in terms of M . The growth
in the achievable rate Rmk is however of different orders in
these cases: With full complexity, the growth order is6 logM ,
while under antenna selection, Rmk grows proportional to7
log logM . This fact indicates that the secrecy cost converges
to zero with lower speed, when a fixed number of antennas
are selected.
Remark 4: By either changing the precoding scheme, e.g.
zero forcing scheme, or using a superior selection algorithm,
e.g. algorithm in [26], the secrecy performance in this setting
is improved. This fact indicates that although the analyses are
given for MRT precoding and a specific selection algorithm,
the results guarantee the achievability of secrecy for free for
a large class of algorithms as well as other precodings.
IV. NUMERICAL INVESTIGATIONS
To confirm our analyses, we consider some numerical ex-
amples. Fig. 1 illustrates the robustness against passive eaves-
dropping under full transmit complexity, i.e., L = M . Here,
K = 4 legitimate users and a single eavesdropper is consid-
ered. The channels are i.i.d. Rayleigh fading with zero mean
and unit variance. It is assumed that the users are uniformly
distributed in the cell, and the path loss is compensated at
the receiving terminals, i.e., βk = 1 for all k. The Signal
to Noise Ratio (SNR) at each legitimate terminal and the
eavesdropper has been set to log ρm = 0 dB and log ρe = −10
dB, respectively. For this setting, the achievable rate over the
6Note that SINRmk grows linearly with M in this case; see (15c).
7Under antenna selection, SINRmk grows with logM ; see (27).
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Fig. 1: The relative secrecy cost, achievable rate and secrecy rate for
each legitimate user versus the number of antennas at the BS. Here,
= 4 log = 0 dB and log 10 dB.
legitimate channel as well as the achievable secrecy
rate for each legitimate user has been plotted as a
function of the number of antennas at the BS
As Fig. 1 shows, the achievable secrecy rate closely tracks
the rate achieved over the legitimate channel in the absence
of the eavesdropper, i.e., . The relative secrecy cost
has been further sketched in Fig. 1. One should note
that is relative, meaning that it does not directly
scale with −R , but with the ratio
)] . As it is observed in the figure, the relative
secrecy cost drops rapidly with respect to the number transmit
antennas which confirms the analysis in Section III-A.
To investigate the robustness against passive eavesdropping
under antenna selection, we have considered a MIMO wiretap
setting with a single legitimate terminal and an eavesdropper
in Fig. 2. Here, the same channel model as in Fig. 1 is
assumed. Moreover, the SNRs at the legitimate terminal
and the eavesdropper have been set log = 0 dB and
log 15 dB, respectively. In this figure, the achievable
rates M,L and M,L , as well as the relative secrecy
cost M,L , have been plotted against the total number
of transmit antennas for two cases of single transmit
antenna selection, i.e. = 1, and = 4. It is assumed
that the algorithm illustrated in Section III-B is employed for
antenna selection. For the sake of comparison the results fo
full transmit complexity have been sketched as well.
As Fig. 2 depicts even with a single active antenna at the
BS, the achievable rate over the legitimate channel and the
secrecy rate meet at large values of . From the figure, it
Note that in this case, due to the uniform distribution of the users in the
cell, and for all
Note that the curves for the case of antenna selection start on the -axis
from , since we have
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Fig. 2: The relative secrecy cost, achievable rate and secrecy rate ver-
sus the total number of transmit antennas for different number
of RF-chains, i.e., = 1 and = 4, at the BS. Here, = 1
log = 0 dB and log 15 dB.
is observed that under antenna selection, the relative secrecy
cost converges to zero slower than the case with full transmi
complexity. In fact, the slope of M,M at large values
of is considerably larger than the slope of M, 1)
and M, 4). As discussed in Remark 3, this observation
comes from the two following facts: 1) The achievable rate
M,L , for a fixed , grows large significantly slower
than M,M , i.e., the rate achieved by full transmit
complexity10, and 2) the information leakage under antenna
selection does not vanishes as fast as the case with all transmit
antennas being active.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the robustness of massive MIMO
wiretap settings against passive eavesdropping. Our investiga-
tions have shown that even when the BS employs a fixed num-
ber of its transmit antennas, including the case with a single
active antenna, the information leakage to the eavesdroppe
vanishes as the total number of transmit antennas grows large.
This fact indicates that in massive MIMO systems, regardles
of the number of active antennas, secrecy is achieved almost
“for free”. Our analytic results guarantee the robustness o
massive MIMO settings against passive eavesdropping for a
large class of selection algorithms and precodings.
From numerical simulations, it is known that in contrast to
setups with passive eavesdroppers, massive MIMO systems
are not robust against active eavesdropping [6]. The large-
system characterization of MIMO wiretap settings under ac-
tive eavesdropping attacks is therefore an interesting direction
for future work. The work in that direction is currently ongo
ing.
10In fact, M,L , for a fixed , grows proportional to log log
while M,M grows with log
Fig. 1: The relative secrecy cost, achievable rate and secrecy rate for
each legitimate user versus the number of anten as at the BS. Here,
K = 4, log ρm = 0 dB and log ρe = −10 dB.
legitimate chan el Rmk (M) as wel as the achievable secrecy
rate for each legitimate user Rsk(M) has be n plot ed as a
function of the number of anten as at the BS8 M .
As Fig. 1 shows, the achievable secrecy rate closely tracks
the rate achieved over the legitimate chan el in the absence
of the eavesdrop er, i.e., Rmk (M). The relative secrecy cost
Ck(M) has be n further sketched in Fig. 1. One should note
that Ck(M) is relative, meaning that it does not directly
scale with Rmk (M)−Rsk(M), but with the ratio [Rmk (M)−
Rsk(M)]/Rmk (M). As it is observed in the figure, the relative
secrecy cost drops rapidly with respect to the number transmit
anten as which confirms the analysis in Section I -A.
To investigate the robustnes against pas ive eavesdrop ing
under anten a selection, we have considered a MIMO wiretap
set ing with a single legitimate terminal and an eavesdrop er
in Fig. 2. Here, the same chan el model as in Fig. 1 is
as umed. Moreover, the SNRs at the legitimate terminal
and the eavesdrop er have be n set log ρm = 0 dB and
log ρe = −15 dB, respectively. In this figure, the achievable
ratesRm1 (M,L) andRs1(M,L), as wel as the relative secrecy
cost C1(M,L), have be n plot ed against the total number
of transmit anten as9 M for two cases of single transmit
anten a selection, i.e. L = 1, and L = 4. It is as umed
that the algorithm il ustrated in Section I -B is employed for
anten a selection. For the sake of comparison the results for
ful transmit complexity have be n sketched as wel .
As Fig. 2 depicts even with a single active anten a at the
BS, the achievable rate over the legitimate chan el and the
secrecy rate me t at large values of M . From the figure, it
8Note that in this case, due to the uniform distribution of the users in the
cell, Rm
k
= Rmj and R
s
k
= Rsj for all k 6= j.
9Note that the curves for the case of antenna selection start on the x-axis
from M = L, since we have M ≥ L.
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Fig. 2: The relative secrecy cost, achievable rate and secrecy rate ver-
sus the total number of transmit anten as M for different number
of RF-chains, i.e., L = 1 and L = 4, at the BS. Here, K = 1,
log ρm = 0 dB and log ρe = −15 dB.
is observed that under anten a selection, the relative secrecy
cost converges to zero slower than the case with ful transmit
complexity. In fact, the slope of C1(M,M) at large values
of M is considerably larger than the slope of C1(M, 1)
and C1(M, 4). As discus ed in Remark 3, this observation
comes from the two fol owing facts: 1) The achievable rate
Rmk (M,L), for a fixed L, grows large significantly slower
than Rmk (M,M), i.e., the rate achieved by ful transmit
complexity10, and 2) the information leakage under anten a
selection does not vanishes as fast as the case with al transmit
anten as being active.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the robustness of massive MIMO
wiretap settings against passive eavesdropping. Our investiga-
tions have shown that even when the BS employs a fixed num-
ber of its transmit antennas, including the case with a single
active antenna, the information leakage to the eavesdropper
vanishes as the total number of transmit antennas grows large.
This fact indicates that in massive MIMO systems, regardless
of the number of active antennas, secrecy is achieved almost
“for free”. Our analytic results guarantee the robustness of
massive MIMO settings against passive eavesdropping for a
large class of selection algorithms and precodings.
From numerical simulations, it is known that in contrast to
setups with passive eavesdroppers, massive MIMO systems
are not robust against active eavesdropping [6]. The large-
system characterization of MIMO wiretap settings under ac-
tive eavesdropping attacks is therefore an interesting direction
for future work. The work in that direction is currently ongo-
ing.
10In fact, Rm
k
(M,L), for a fixed L, grows proportional to log logM ,
while Rm
k
(M,M) grows with logM .
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